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ABSTRACT
In 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Lawson, a case of
first impression about a juror’s use of Wikipedia during
deliberations. Had this case been decided in the 1950s, the
juror’s contact with the extra-record material during
deliberations would have given rise to a presumption of
prejudice in favor of the party claiming he was denied a
fair trial. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, the United
States Supreme Court seemed to eliminate that presumption
and place the burden of proving prejudice on the party
seeking a new trial. As a result, federal circuit courts today
disagree as to when, if at all, the moving party should enjoy
a presumption of prejudice in such cases. But every federal
circuit court’s substantive analysis focuses on the nature
and impact of the extra-record contact, regardless of
whether the presumption applies. This common substantive
analysis has been used in Internet-based misconduct cases
and should be expected in Wikipedia-based misconduct
cases.
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2014. Thank you to Maurice Classen and Todd Maybrown for their invaluable
expert commentary, Maureen Howard and Sarah Kaltsounis for their ongoing
academic support and review, and Lauren Guicheteau and Chelsey Heindel for
their guidance and thoughtful input.
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INTRODUCTION
Practitioners who allege that the jury in their client’s trial has
been prejudiced by coming into contact with electronic extrarecord material should know that the circuit split over the
presumption of prejudice is no split at all and that a common
analysis applies. Technology has made it easier for jurors to access
electronic extra-record material during deliberations and thereby
engage in misconduct worthy of a new trial. But these advances in
technology are coming at a time when federal circuit courts remain
split over how to approach jury misconduct. Since the 1980s and
1990s, the federal courts have not applied a uniform approach to
assessing unauthorized, potentially influential contact between the
jury and extra-record material during deliberations. Some circuits
approach this type of misconduct by presuming prejudice to the
defendant, others utilize no such presumption, and still others will
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presume prejudice only in certain cases. 1
In light of new and changing technologies, these various
approaches to jury misconduct may need to adapt. The Fourth
Circuit’s novel finding in United States v. Lawson suggests that a
juror’s contact with Wikipedia is more prejudicial than contact
with other types of offline material. 2 However, despite the circuit
split, three factors indicate the utility of a core analysis in cases of
Wikipedia-based jury misconduct. This particular type of
misconduct should not be subject to divergent analyses because of
the overwhelming consistency among federal circuit courts in
analyzing accusations of jury misconduct, the fact that these courts
are employing the same analysis in the emerging Internet-based
misconduct cases, and the fact that the only circuit court to address
Wikipedia-based misconduct was ultimately unsure of how to
approach the issue. Regardless of the labels different courts put on
their approach to jury misconduct analysis and the uniqueness of
the Internet and Wikipedia as sources of juror misconduct, the
analysis is and will be the same in every circuit.
I. THE CAUSE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Over the course of almost six decades, beginning in 1954, the
Supreme Court created and subsequently rejected a presumption of
prejudice when a juror comes into contact with potentially
influential, extra-record materials or persons during deliberations.
Jurors can only consider the material and witnesses presented to
them during the trial. 3 A key component to jury trials is the ability
of the court to insulate jurors from material beyond that
purposefully presented to them at trial. 4 If a juror does come into
contact with anything beyond that offered at trial, unfair prejudice
might arise. 5
1

See infra Part II.
United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 650–51 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting
that the court is “troubled by Wikipedia’s lack of reliability”).
3
25 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 624.72[1],
at 624–96 (3d ed. 2002).
4
1 DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
§ 1.2 (2012).
5
Id.
2
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In 1954, the Supreme Court decided Remmer v. United States,
which established a rebuttable presumption of prejudice when
jurors come into contact with potentially influential, extra-record
material or persons. 6 In Remmer, an unnamed person attempted to
bribe a juror for a favorable verdict. 7 After the juror reported this
bribe and while the jury deliberated, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) investigated the bribe. 8
The Court, observing that any contact “with a juror during a
trial about the matter pending” is presumptively prejudicial, held
that the unduly impressive and potentially chilling effect of the FBI
investigation might have prejudiced the jurors. 9 To be certain, the
Court instructed the trial court to determine the circumstances of
the contact, its impact, and any resulting prejudice via a hearing.10
At this hearing, the government may attempt to show that the
contact was harmless; however, the Court noted that the
government’s burden when rebutting the presumption is “heavy.” 11
Decades later, the Supreme Court decisions in Smith v. Phillips
and United States v. Olano suggested a withdrawal from the strict
presumption previously articulated in Remmer. 12 In Phillips, a
juror applied for a position with the District Attorney’s office
prosecuting the case. 13 The Supreme Court held that this contact,
which tended to improperly impress upon the juror’s decisions
regarding the case, required a Remmer hearing. 14 More
specifically, the Remmer approach to allegations of juror
impartiality applied because the Court accepted that “‘the average
man in [the juror’s] position would believe that the verdict of the
6

Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
Id. at 228.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 229.
10
Id. at 230.
11
Id. at 229. Typically, the government’s burden of showing harmless error
is by a preponderance of the evidence, but Remmer and its progeny do not
clarify. See United States v. Glover, 413 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Jackson, 60 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Eli,
718 F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1983).
12
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S.
209 (1982).
13
Phillips, 455 U.S. at 212 (quoting Phillips v. Smith, 485 F. Supp. 1365,
1371–72 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
14
Id. at 230.
7
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jury would directly affect the evaluation of his job application.’” 15
The Court maintained, however, that at this hearing “the
defendant ha[d] the opportunity to prove actual bias” and that it
was “‘the defendant’s right to demonstrate’” the alleged
prejudice. 16 These articulations suggest a theoretical tailoring of
that undefined, “heavy” burden in Remmer. Now, suggested the
Phillips Court, the defendant must prove or demonstrate the bias
that was supposed to be presumed in his favor. That is, the
defendant has the burden of persuasion.
In Olano, the Supreme Court also appeared to move away from
the strict presumption by emphasizing that the trial court’s inquiry
into this type of jury misconduct can either be framed as a
rebuttable presumption or as a specific analysis. 17 In Olano, the
improper contact was the presence of alternate jurors in the jury
room during deliberations. 18 Since defense counsel did not object
to their presence, the undue influential capacity of the alternates
was analyzed using plain error review. 19 Under plain error review
the burden of persuasion automatically attaches to the defendant,
but the Court discussed arguendo how to analyze this intrusion
under Remmer. 20 The Court noted that “a presumption of prejudice
as opposed to a specific analysis does not change the ultimate
inquiry: Did the intrusion affect the jury’s deliberations and
thereby its verdict?”21 Some federal circuit courts agree that this
newfound emphasis on the subject of the inquiry over framing
dilutes the strength of the strict Remmer presumption. 22 Still,
because neither Phillips nor Olano expressly overturned Remmer,
other circuits keep the burden on the government.

15

Id. at 214.
Id. at 215, 217 (quoting in part Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 575
(1981)).
17
Lawson, 677 F.3d at 642.
18
Olano, 507 U.S. at 727.
19
Id. at 725.
20
Id. at 734, 737–38.
21
Id. at 739.
22
See Lawson, 677 F.3d at 643 (citing the cases that hold Olano constituted
negative treatment of Remmer).
16
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II. THE THREE APPROACHES
In response to the creation of and possible withdrawal from the
presumption of prejudice, the federal circuit courts have developed
three approaches to improper extra-record contact: (1) applying the
Remmer presumption, (2) abandoning the Remmer presumption,
and (3) determining whether or not to apply the Remmer
presumption based on the severity of the contact. There is some
debate over which category the Eighth and Ninth circuits fit into,
but the remaining circuits’ approaches are clear. Each approach is
carried out pursuant to an abuse of discretion review, as it is wellsettled law that upon investigating “whether and to what extent the
conduct was prejudicial, the trial court has wide discretion.” 23
A. Applying the Remmer Presumption: Second, Fourth, Seventh,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
The Second, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits
apply the Remmer presumption when analyzing jury misconduct. 24
The clearest statement of this continued adherence to Remmer can
be found in the Eleventh Circuit. In United States v. Ronda, a case
later distinguished on unrelated grounds and never overturned, the
court held that the defendant only has “to show that the jury has
been exposed to extrinsic evidence or extrinsic contacts[,]” and
that “[o]nce the defendant establishes that such exposure in fact
occurred, prejudice is presumed . . . .” 25 Upon a mere showing of
inappropriate extra-record contact, courts in the Eleventh Circuit
will shift the burden to the government to prove that the contact
was not prejudicial. 26 The Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth
23

STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF
REVIEW § 12.06 (4th ed. 2010).
24
See Lawson, 677 F.3d at 644 (noting that Remmer has “continued
vitality”); United States v. Moore, 641 F.3d 812, 828 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that
the Remmer presumption is still good law); United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d
1273, 1299 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir.
2002) (“It is well-settled that any extra-record information of which the juror
becomes aware is presumed prejudicial.”); United States v. Aguirre, 108 F.3d
1284, 1288 (10th Cir. 1997).
25
Ronda, 455 F.3d at 1299.
26
Id.
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circuits have endorsed the same approach and presume prejudice in
favor of the potentially disadvantaged moving party. 27
B. Abandoning the Remmer Presumption: Fifth,
Sixth, and D.C. Circuits
The circuits maintaining the second approach—no presumption
at all—are the Fifth, Sixth, and D.C. circuits. 28 The Sixth Circuit in
particular started to move away from the Remmer presumption the
year after Phillips was decided, which was almost a decade before
Olano reinforced the Phillips holding. In United States v. Pennell,
the Sixth Circuit held that “[i]n light of Phillips, the burden of
proof rests upon a defendant to demonstrate that unauthorized
communications with jurors resulted in actual juror partiality.
Prejudice is not to be presumed.” 29 The Fifth and D.C. circuits
have issued similar opinions. 30
C. Letting Severity Dictate Application of the Remmer
Presumption: First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
The First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth circuits apply the
presumption only if the juror’s misconduct is severe enough. In
these circuits, courts may approach the misconduct with a
presumption of prejudice only after assessing the extra-record
material’s degree of relevance and type. 31 The First Circuit’s
27

See cases cited supra note 24.
United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
that “the Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano”);
United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding
there is no presumption, rather there is a weighing of the likelihood of
prejudice); United States v. Gillespie, 61 F.3d. 457, 460 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding
that “the defendant must prove that [the juror] was prejudiced thereby; prejudice
is not presumed”).
29
United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532 (6th Cir. 1984).
30
See cases cited supra note 28.
31
United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 238 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the
Third Circuit applies the Remmer “presumption of prejudice only when the
extraneous information is of a considerably serious nature”); United States v.
Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that only when the jury is
actively influenced, or tampered with, by an extrinsic contact does the
presumption of prejudice arise; “prosaic” contacts do not warrant a
28
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opinion in United States v. Bradshaw illustrates this approach. 32 In
that case, the court maintained that, while the First Circuit still
employs a Remmer presumption in some jury misconduct cases,
that presumption did not apply when the jury came into contact
with a magazine describing one of the attorneys in the case as that
“of choice for ‘[e]very troubled mobster’ in Boston.” 33 Despite the
fact that this quote both suggested that the defendant was a
mobster and undermined defense counsel’s credibility, the court
did not grant the defendant the benefit of the Remmer presumption.
In the court’s view, the extra-record material was just not nefarious
or egregious enough to warrant such a presumption. 34 Responding
similarly, the Third, Eighth, and Ninth circuits apply the Remmer
presumption only when the intruding material is of a certain,
especially heinous type. 35
III. A COMMON ANALYSIS
Despite their differences, courts in each circuit engage in the
same analysis when faced with jury misconduct. This analysis
always addresses two basic questions: (1) what was the contact,
and (2) what could its impact have been? To answer these
questions, the circuit courts have created multi-factor rubrics that
focus the court’s attention on the nature of the contact and the
extent to which the jury appears to have relied upon it. Whether a
particular circuit’s analysis is strictly limited to those two
questions, calls for a looser list of factors that can ultimately be
reduced to these questions, or implements a more formal list that
can similarly be reduced, these are always the two basic questions.
An example of the first, strictly-limited type of analysis comes
from the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit has held that a court
presumption); United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the Remmer presumption of prejudice only applies if the contacted
material is extra-record factual evidence); United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d
230, 261 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that the Remmer “presumption is applicable
only where there is an egregious tampering” in “the jury process”).
32
United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 287-88 (1st Cir. 2002).
33
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting in part United States v. Boylan, 898
F.2d 230, 258 n.17 (1st Cir. 1990)).
34
Id. at 288.
35
See cases cited supra note 31.
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should determine what the extra-record material was and what the
jury did with that material. 36 The central focus of the analysis is
the “what” and the “how.” The First, Second, Fifth, and Eighth
circuits engage in a similar analysis, requiring only a bifurcated
assessment of the contact, its nature, and how its impression may
have affected the jury; and the extent, magnitude, or gravity of the
intrusion into the jury’s deliberation. 37
An illustration of the second type of analysis can be found in
the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit has held that, although there is
no explicit controlling list of factors, several factors found together
suggest prejudice. 38 The factors that the Third Circuit has
considered include the relatedness of the contact to an element of
the crime charged, whether the material referenced was within the
generalized knowledge of the juror or jurors affected, the extent to
which the juror shared his or her improper impression with other
jurors, when the contact occurred during deliberations, and the
efficacy of curative jury instructions. 39
A consideration of these several factors can be reduced to a
single analysis of the material’s impact on the jury. The extent to
which the jury may have been prejudiced by the improper contact
will be greater if the contact was relevant to the crime charged,
outside the scope of the juror’s generalized knowledge, impressed
upon all of the jurors instead of just one, invaded deliberations
right before the jury rendered its verdict, and was not addressed by
the jury instructions. The number and strength of these factors in a
given case influence whether the court believes that the contact
was of such magnitude or gravity to justify setting aside a
36

United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir. 1985).
See Bradshaw, 281 F.3d at 289 (explaining that the court must “assess the
magnitude of the event and the extent of the resultant prejudice”); Blumeyer, 62
F.3d at 1017 (holding that the contact was not prejudicial because of what it was
and because of how it was used by the jury); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d
777, 783 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting United States ex. rel. Owen v. McMann, 435
F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1970)) (noting that the touchstone in the court’s
assessment of the misconduct is “‘the nature of what has been infiltrated and the
probability of prejudice’”); United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 980 (5th
Cir. 1978) (holding that the court, during the hearing, must asses the “likely
extent and gravity of the prejudice generated by” the misconduct).
38
Lloyd, 269 F.3d at 239.
39
Id. at 239–41.
37
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conviction. Essentially, this analysis is merely a re-articulation or a
“breaking up” of the second central question: what was the likely
impact of the contacted extra-record material on the jury? The
Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. circuits also employ this type of
analysis. 40
The Tenth Circuit provides the best example of the third type
of analysis. In the oft-cited case Mayhue v. St. Francis Hospital of
Wichita, Inc., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals provided a list of
five factors that determine prejudice in cases where the jury has
come into unauthorized contact with a hard copy dictionary. 41
These five factors are (1) the centrality of the word to the case, (2)
how the definition differs from the legal definition, (3) how the
jury emphasized the definition, (4) the strength of the properly
presented material and when the definition was introduced to the
jury, and (5) any other factors. 42
Like with the Third Circuit’s rough list of factors, these five
can be reduced to the second question noted supra—what was the
impact of the contact on the jury? Once again, if the word or the
contact is central to the resolution of the case, the material differs
substantially from the material legally in front of the jury, the jury
relied on the material for its decision, the authorized material in
front of the jury is weak, and the jury came to its decision
immediately after the contact, then the extent of prejudice created
by the contact is greater than if one of these factors was not
present. The list of factors is just an attempt to provide dimension
to the extent analysis in which courts in all other circuits already
engage. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits use a similarly formal list of
40

See Ronda, 455 F.3d at 1300 (the factors a court can “consider include:
(1) the nature of the extrinsic evidence; (2) the manner in which the information
reached the jury; (3) the factual findings in the district court and the manner of
the court’s inquiry into the juror issues, and (4) the strength of the government's
case”); Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 497 (maintaining that the court should
consider “a range of factors,” including the nature, length, and impact of the
contact); United States v. Sanders, 962 F.2d 660, 668-69 (7th Cir. 1992)
(maintaining that the factors “a court should look to in making this
determination include the extent and nature of the unauthorized contact, the
power of curative instructions, and the responses of the jury”).
41
Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 969 F.2d 919, 924 (10th
Cir. 1992).
42
Id.
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factors. 43
IV. ADDING THE ELEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY
Today, advances in technology have made it possible for an
endless sea of electronically stored material to infiltrate jury
deliberations. The Internet is a ready source of extra-record
material and misconduct because unauthorized, potentially
influential contact is just a few “clicks” away. The proliferation of
Internet use during jury deliberations poses a challenging question
to trial attorneys. Will unauthorized contact with the Internet
change the core analysis discussed above? The Internet, a unique
source of extra-record material, has the potential to affect the
analysis because it is transient and much of its content is not
subject to the integrity constraints of other media.
The few cases in this area suggest that federal courts will not
analyze Internet-based contacts differently than other contacts.
Courts have applied the core analysis discussed above to cases
involving general Internet research and Internet searches to define
terms. This approach does not refer to the unique dangers posed by
the Internet. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit’s primary focus in
United States v. Lawson, a key case involving Wikipedia, was on
other factors not specific to Wikipedia. Therefore, while the
Lawson court suggested that Wikipedia as a specific source of
material contributes to prejudice, practitioners should not expect
any change to the core analysis.
A. General Internet Research
When a juror comes into contact with unauthorized Internet
research, circuit courts have appeared to pay little attention to the
fact that the potentially prejudicial material was found on the
Internet. In United States v. Lopez-Martinez, a juror compiled
Internet research in an effort to be “as prepared as possible” for
deliberations concerning a conspiracy to bring illegal aliens into
43

See Lawson, 677 F.3d at 646 (applying the Mayhue factors); Marino v.
Vasquez, 812 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 1987) (listing five factors when assessing
jury misconduct including the length of time the material was available to the
jurors and the extent to which it was discussed).
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the country. 44 Upon discovering that this research infiltrated the
jury room on the first day of deliberations, the defendant moved
for a new trial. 45 The district court denied the motion without
venturing into the content of the research or the fact that it was
from the Internet. Rather, the district court’s denial relied on the
fact that the vexatious juror had been dismissed following a middeliberation hearing and the research had not reached the other
jurors. 46 The appellate court affirmed the denial. 47 The trial court’s
analysis of the extent to which jurors relied upon the extra-record
material was sufficient even though it did not reach the actual
content of the research or the fact that it was from the Internet.
This analysis is well within the previously discussed traditional
core analysis, as it focuses simply on the impact of the
unauthorized contact.
Likewise, in Moore v. American Family Mutual Insurance
Company, a district court denied a defendant’s motion for a
mistrial despite the fact that the jurors came into unauthorized
contact with the defendant’s financial information. 48 The jurors
came into contact with this material via the Internet. Even though
one juror said that the defendant “‘makes huge profits and can
afford to pay[,]’” the defendant’s motion was denied. 49 In so
holding, the trial court said that there was no prejudice because the
defendant’s ability to pay “was ‘not likely to be a major revelation’
to members of the jury.” 50 The fact that the extra-record material
came from the Internet was again irrelevant. The mere fact that the
material was not outside the generalized knowledge of the jury was
relevant. This concept is well within the traditional core analysis.
In United States v. Farhane, a case where the court “considered
the ‘nature’ of the extrinsic evidence[,]” or what the evidence was,
the fact that the evidence was from the Internet was, yet again,
irrelevant. 51 In that case, a juror used Google to discover that a co44

United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 543 F.3d 509, 513, 517 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 517.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Moore v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 781, 787 (8th Cir. 2009).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 169 (2d Cir. 2011).
45
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defendant had pled guilty to “unspecified charges,” and the juror
then told that fact to the other jurors. 52 After analyzing the “nature”
of the evidence, the trial court concluded, and the appellate court
affirmed, that a mistrial was unnecessary. 53 They held that the
guilty plea was consistent with evidence presented at trial. 54 The
extent of the contact’s prejudicial impact was negligible or of such
a magnitude not to warrant a new trial. The form of the material
and vehicle by which the juror accesses the material are part of its
“nature,” but the mere fact that its form was electronic and the
vehicle was the Internet did not enter the court’s analysis. The
Internet does not, in and of itself, establish grounds for a finding of
prejudice.
B. Defining Terms
When a juror conducts an Internet search specifically to define
a term, courts follow the same core analysis. In United States v.
Showa, an unpublished opinion, a juror looked up the term
“telemarketing” online during deliberations. 55 After questioning
the juror who had done the research as well as the other jurors, all
of whom said the definition was “general” or “insignificant,” the
district court concluded that there was no prejudice warranting a
new trial. 56 The district court judge took the jurors’ testimony as
reliable and stopped the inquiry. Since the jurors said the definition
had little or no impact on their knowledge, the trial court found no
prejudice. The court did not investigate the nature of the definition
at all, and the appellate court affirmed without hesitation.
Another case in which the outcome was not affected by
Internet use was United States v. Bristol-Martir. In that case, a
juror used the Internet to define legal terms, and the district court
found no prejudice, but the appellate court did not affirm. The
district court questioned the errant juror extensively and finally
dismissed her after becoming aware that her position in the case
52

Id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
54
Id.
55
United States v. Showa, Nos. 96-50698, 97-50017, 1997 WL 801452, at
*1 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 1997).
56
Id.
53
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was based on her own research. 57 However, the district court did
not grant the defendant’s motion for a mistrial, stating that the
“juror's research and subsequent statements to the other jurors did
not taint the jury.” 58
The appellate court disagreed with this conclusion because the
court neither questioned each juror independently as to whether he
or she was influenced, nor attempted to cure any undue influence
beyond making slight adjustments to the general jury
instructions. 59 Therefore, the judgment was vacated and the case
was remanded for a new trial. 60 Neither court’s analysis focused on
the fact that the extra-record material came from the Internet or
that the juror had used an Internet-sourced definition. The focus
was on the extent to which each juror relied on the research and
whether the court properly mitigated against this improper
reliance. The district court and appellate court disagreed on the
potential extent of the jury’s contact with the extrinsic evidence,
but they did not disagree as to whether the Internet-based nature of
the evidence was especially problematic.
C. Wikipedia-Based Jury Misconduct
The only circuit court case that has tackled the issue of
Wikipedia-based jury misconduct is United States v. Lawson. 61 In
this case, the district court and the circuit court applied the Mayhue
factors in their attempt to decide whether or not a juror’s
Wikipedia research on the definition of “sponsor”—a definition
crucial to an element of the animal fighting offense charged 62—
warranted a new trial. 63 The trial court concluded that “there was
no reasonable possibility that the external influence caused actual
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Id. at 36.
Id. at 38.
59
Id. at 43.
60
Id. at 34.
61
Lawson, 677 F.3d at 644–46 (stating that “such a situation is an issue of
first impression in this Court” and that the court cannot point to other circuit
court cases, despite its lengthy cross-circuit analysis, related to jury misconduct
involving Wikipedia definitions).
62
Id. at 636.
63
Id. at 636, 646.
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prejudice,” and denied the defendant’s motion. 64
On appeal the circuit court found that there were grounds for
granting a new trial. 65 The court’s decision hinged on how integral
the term defined was to the crime charged, i.e., the first Mayhue
factor; and the difference between the Wikipedia definition and the
legal definition the court would have given if asked, i.e., the
second Mayhue factor. 66 Since the word “sponsor” was part of an
element of a crime the defendant was charged with and the
definition was at odds with its legal counterpart, the court vacated
the judgment and remanded for a new trial. 67
The fact that the definition came from Wikipedia, a crowdmoderated website featuring content that changes frequently,
weighed in favor of remand as well. 68 But that fact was not
conclusive in and of itself. 69 The Wikipedia factor was not one of
the court’s central focuses. If anything, the court was unsure of
how to weigh that fact. 70 Moreover, the court’s use of the oft-cited
Mayhue factors, born of misconduct involving a hard copy
dictionary, 71 further suggests that the court was not prepared to
abandon the traditional, pre-Internet analysis.
Therefore, the court’s consideration of the Wikipedia element
is not a harbinger of change to the core misconduct analysis. To
conclude that the Lawson court’s mere acknowledgement of
Wikipedia’s uniqueness will make Wikipedia-based jury
misconduct presumptively more prejudicial would be at odds with
the forces behind the core analysis, which transcended the
superficial circuit split. Such a view incorrectly characterizes
Lawson as exceptional among other cases involving Internet
research and defining terms, and misplaces the Fourth Circuit’s
64

Id. at 641 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 655.
66
Id. at 646, 648, 655.
67
Id. at 654–55.
68
Id. at 650–51 (noting that the court is “troubled by Wikipedia’s lack of
reliability”).
69
Id. (explaining that the first Mayhue factor weighed “strongly in favor of
[the defendant]” while the other factors were less significant).
70
Id. (noting that “there remain many unresolved questions in this case due
to the unreliability and ever-changing nature of Wikipedia”).
71
See Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 924.
65
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CONCLUSION
The Internet, with its seductive speed, expansive accessibility,
and countless sources of information, is an emerging source of
problems for trial lawyers whose juries may succumb to its allure
during trial. Yet this potential source of prejudice will meet the
same misconduct analysis as every other juror contact with extrarecord material. Despite the circuit split over the proper application
of the presumption of prejudice and the burden of showing the
effect of extrinsic material, federal appellate courts tend to use a
traditional undue influence rubric. The substantive nature and
ultimate impact of the contact will be the court’s primary focus,
rather than the medium by which the juror came into contact with
the material. A prudent practitioner should base his or her
argument on that core analysis as cases of Inernet-based, and
Wikipedia-based, jury misconduct start to bombard courtrooms.
PRACTICE POINTERS


When preparing a motion for mistrial or a new trial, or a
response to said motion, focus on the substantive nature of
the extra-record contact and its ultimate prejudicial impact
on the jury.



When assessing juror misconduct, do not waste too much
time dealing with the presumption of prejudice, or lack
thereof. Just research the language and framing of the
analysis used in the circuit so as to best phrase the core
argument.



Be diligent about jurors’ use of electronic devices during or
outside of trial.

